The Strategic Gambit for Critical Minerals in Central Asia

In the wake of the escalating Ukraine crisis and the subsequent restructuring of the global order, Western powers have actively sought alternative suppliers for critical minerals to decouple from Russian and Chinese dependencies. This has triggered a competitive “New Great Game” in Central Asia. To capitalize on this interest, Central Asian nations have adopted a pragmatic posture, pursuing “multi-vector, balanced diplomacy” to expand multilateral collaborations, hedge against great-power influence, and advance their sovereign development agendas.

I. The New Western Blueprint for Central Asian Minerals

The U.S. and the EU are intensifying their strategic inroads into Central Asia through institutional, financial, and technical levers to diversify their supply chains and solidify regional influence.

1. Mainstreaming Mineral Supply Chains in Diplomatic Mechanisms

• The “C5+1″ Framework: Critical minerals have been elevated to a standalone pillar. Recent summits emphasized building resilient supply chains and developing advanced extraction/processing technologies to reduce strategic vulnerabilities.

• EU Strategic Partnership: At the April 2025 EU-Central Asia Summit, the relationship was upgraded to a Strategic Partnership, accompanied by a Memorandum of Intent on Critical Raw Materials, specifically targeting manganese and rare earths.

• Bilateral Hubs: The U.S. is prioritizing bilateral ties with “pivotal states.” In April 2025, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Uzbek Foreign Minister Bakhtiyor Saidov signed a Mining Investment Agreement covering exploration, milling equipment manufacturing, and talent cultivation. Similarly, the EU views Kazakhstan as its primary partner for oil, uranium, and critical raw materials.

2. Financial Penetration and Technical Assistance

• Funding Vehicles: The EU has deployed the €12 billion “Global Gateway” Investment Plan. The U.S. is channeling funds through the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP) and the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII).

• Technical Mapping: The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) has mapped 384 potential sites for rare and critical minerals across the region. Furthermore, the French Geological Survey (BRGM) signed a 2024 agreement with Uzbekistan to develop digital infrastructure for mineral data management.

3. Building Anti-China Coalitions via “Mineral Clubs”

• The “Metals NATO”: In July 2024, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan joined the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP) Forum, a move seen as securing U.S. influence over global resource governance.

• Counter-Initiatives: The PGII and the Central Asia Economic Resilience Initiative are explicitly positioned as geopolitical tools to counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) by diversifying trade routes and harmonizing environmental/social (ESG) standards via the Energy Resource Governance Initiative (ERGI).

II. Central Asia’s Multi-Vector and Balanced Strategy

Central Asian nations adhere to the principle of strategic autonomy, proactively balancing Western technical/financial cooperation with established ties to China and Russia, while engaging other major economies.

1. Leveraging Western Resources for Domestic Growth

• Strategic Declarations: Kazakhstan has signed MOUs and “Roadmaps” for critical minerals with the UK, France, and the EU.

• Localization & JVs: Uzbekistan’s Nurlikum Mining (a JV with French giant Orano) exemplifies this trend, with Orano providing 51% of capital and technology. Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in Tashkent offer preferential policies to attract overseas mining majors.

• Infrastructure Financing: In March 2025, the EBRD and EIB provided over €200 million in loans and guarantees to Kazakhstan for sustainable transport and rare earth projects.

2. Deepening Strategic Cooperation with China and Russia

• BRI Alignment: Under the Xi’an Declaration, China and Central Asia are building an Energy Development Partnership. This includes aligning China’s BRI with Kazakhstan’s “Just Kazakhstan” economic policy and Tajikistan’s “National Development Strategy 2030.”

• Green Energy Transition: Major Chinese-led projects, such as wind farms in Zhanatas (Kazakhstan) and solar/storage facilities in Uzbekistan (Bukhara), are currently operational or under construction.

• Value Chain Dominance: China remains the largest importer of Central Asian minerals, with Chinese firms holding the majority of mining licenses in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.

3. Expanding Partnerships with Other Global Economies

• South Korea: A “Resources + Technology” model has emerged, marked by the establishment of Central Asia’s first Rare Metals Research Center in Uzbekistan.

• Japan: Cooperation focuses on long-term energy security (natural gas and uranium) through the “Central Asia + Japan” dialogue framework.

• India: The 2024 India-Central Asia Rare Earths Forum and subsequent 2025 dialogues focused on joint exploration and mining ventures.

• Gulf States: In 2025, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan invited GCC countries (such as Qatar) to participate in the entire value chain—from exploration to innovative processing—positioning natural resources as the cornerstone of bilateral cooperation.